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Abstract 
Little is known about the ideological relationship between the Swiss political elite and the 
general public. Based on the SELECTS 2007 candidate and voter surveys, we compare the 
value orientations of both groups by applying ordinal factor analysis. First, we test whether 
political leaders or their supporters are more ideologically polarized. Second, we investigate 
whether ideological congruency between the electorate and representatives varies from party 
to party. Third, we examine whether winning candidates are ideologically more remote from 
their party supporters than unsuccessful candidates. We find that ideological polarization is 
larger within the political elite than within the general public. As a consequence, 
representatives of parties with rather extreme value orientations represent the moderate 
electorate rather poorly. Similarly, successful candidates are found to be more distant from 
their party supporters than unsuccessful candidates. These findings challenge traditional 
spatial voting theory but accord nicely with the directional model of voting behavior.  
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Introduction1 
Political philosophers and political scientists alike have long been concerned with the nature 
of political representation in democracies. Early empirical analyses of the elite-mass 
relationship (cf. Converse 1964) revealed significant differences between the ideological 
reasoning of politicians and the public. By the mid 20th century, it became generally accepted 
that the elites and the general public simply think differently about politics (Kinder 1998). 
The traditional view of elite-mass divergence, however, is challenged in modern democracies. 
More than ever, politicians and citizens find themselves in a close and interdependent 
relationship. On the one hand, political leaders must follow public opinion because they aim 
to get reelected (Stimson 1991). On the other hand, political elites function as opinion leaders 
(Zaller 1992). This interdependency is assumed to bring politicians and voters closer to each 
other in terms of ideology and political attitudes.  
Given the importance of the democratic ideal, a long tradition of empirical research exists on 
the elite-mass relationship. In the past decade, for instance, research has focused on two major 
topics in the field of representation: dynamic representation (Erikson et al. 2002, Stimson et 
al. 1995) and sub-constituency representation (Bartels 2009, Gilens 2005). These studies 
suggest that elites adjust their policies in response to shifts in mass political opinion, and that 
politicians are disproportionately responsive to electoral subgroups composed of highly 
educated and sophisticated citizens (Adams and Ezrow 2009). 
Yet most empirical studies on political representation and the mass-elite relationship rely on 
different measures of ideology for the elite and for the general public. Whereas citizens’ 
ideology and attitudes are measured by survey responses, the ideology of the political elite is 
most often estimated with their voting behavior in parliament, i.e., by roll call voting data.2 
Other strategies employed to measure value orientations of the political elite are expert 
interviews (c.f. Hug and Schulz 2007) and media content analysis (c.f. Lachat 2008). It is 
important to note, however, that all of these approaches to comparing the political views of 
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citizens and politicians are limited in that they are derived from differing data sources (Powell 
1982, Highton and Rocca 2005).  
Roll call data, for instance, reflect the perceived preferences of MPs based on their voting 
behavior, but this is not the same as their actual preferences. Party pressure, constituency 
pressure and the strategic nature of voting may distort these ideological measures (e.g. Clinton 
et al. 2004b, Cox and McCubbins 2005). Similarly, media content analysis and expert 
interviews may also be prone to distortion, as they do not control for strategic positioning. 
Ultimately, if the ideological positions are derived with different methods and data, it is not 
even assured that the same ideological dimensions are analyzed for both subgroups (Lachat 
2008). 
One then wishes to compare mass and elite political views using identical data for each group. 
However, only rarely have researchers had the opportunity to analyze comparable survey data 
for both politicians and citizens.3 While the few studies that do this have strengths on an 
empirical level, their weaknesses lie in the realm of theory. The designs of these analyses are 
generally descriptive and are not aimed at testing any hypotheses about ideological 
relationship.4 In this respect, our analysis will be no exception. Although we embed our 
analysis in the broader literature on polarization, voting behavior and party and candidate 
strategies, our primary goal will not be to explain – or test – why Swiss politicians and voters 
differ ideologically. Rather, we will analyze whether these groups’ political views do differ at 
all, and whether they do so systematically. We will then discuss whether our findings are in 
line with common theories and similar empirical evidence found in other countries, mainly 
from the United States and Australia. Hence, our study will not be explanatory, but rather 
descriptive and exploratory.  
Our analysis benefits from the exceptional data gathered in the SELECTS 2007 Survey, 
where voters and candidates were asked identical questions about their political values.5 We 
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are thereby comfortably positioned to compare the ideological views of party elites and party 
supporters directly and without methodological bias. As we are primarily interested in the 
ideological positions of the individual candidate and voter, or the mean party candidate and 
mean party voter, we ignore the fact that electoral competition is based to a large extent on 
party manifestos and party communication. Along with the preliminary analyses of Lutz 
(2008) and Schwarz (2007), this study is the first systematic and comprehensive comparison 
of politicians’ and voters’ value orientations for Switzerland. 
We will focus on three main aspects of the ideological mass-elite relationship that other 
studies comparing survey responses for both groups have highlighted. First, we will explore 
whether it is the general public or the political elite that is more polarized or extreme 
politically (McClosky et al. 1960, McAllister 1991, Lutz 2008). Second, we will analyze 
ideological congruency between parties, i.e., whether candidates of one party represent the 
views of their party supporters more closely than candidates of other parties (McAllister 1991, 
Lutz 2008). Third, we will investigate the phenomenon observed elsewhere wherein 
successful candidates are ideologically more remote from their party supporters than 
unsuccessful candidates (Achen 1978, McAllister 1991, Schwartz 2007). 
 
Theory  
Ideological Polarization 
In his seminal work, Converse (1964, Converse and Pierce 1986) observes that the general 
public lacks ideological consistency. Recent scholarly research seems to agree that the elite is 
not only more ideological consistent than the general public, but also more polarized. As 
Adams and Merrill (1999: 765) summarize, “One of the most discussed findings from the 
literature on political representation is that political parties and candidates typically present 
policy positions that are similar to, but more extreme than, the positions of their party 
supporters.” Furthermore, several studies suggest that elite and mass polarization have been 
diverging in past decades. Studies consistently show an increasingly polarized US Congress, 
with party members clustering towards the ideological poles (Hetherington 2009). Evidence 
that ordinary American citizens have become similarly polarized is, in contrast, less clear. 
Fiorina et al. (2004) argue that voters only appear polarized because the political arena only 
offers polarized choices, but voters’ preferences remain essentially moderate. As a result of 
increasing elite polarization, however, partisans in the general public are following what are 
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now clearer elite cues to sort themselves into the ‘correct’ party (Hetherington 2009). Fiorina 
and Levendusky (2006) term this process that is observed within the mass ‘party sorting,’ 
reserving the term ‘polarization’ exclusively for the political elite. 
There are several explanations for the differing polarization levels between the general public 
and the elite. Rokeach (1973), for instance, posits that it is radicalism that drives an ordinary 
citizen to become a politician. Since ideologically radical individuals seek to have their views 
realized in politics, they become politically active and run for office. This self-selection 
process then results in an elite that is more ideologically polarized than the general public. 
Similarly, May (1973) argues that party activists tend to take extreme policy positions and, 
through intraparty nomination processes, these attitudes drive the parties towards the policy 
positions of activists and away from those of their mass supporters. Finally, Przeworski and 
Sprague (1987) identify strategic causes of differing polarization, proposing that party elites 
offer relatively extreme programs in order to change voters’ preferences. 
The few studies that use survey data for both candidates and voters – as we do – report 
evidence generally supporting the elitist polarization thesis. McClosky et al. (1960) find that 
leaders of the two main US parties diverged strongly, but that their followers differed only 
moderately in their political attitudes. Similarly, McAllister (1991) observes that in Australia, 
candidates showed considerably more polarization on various political issues than voters. In 
particular, the conflict between candidates and voters is more severe on the traditional left-
right dimension than on the authoritarian-libertarian dimension.  
For Switzerland, Lutz (2008) also reports greater polarization among the elite than among the 
general public. His analysis is based on self-placements of voters and candidates on the left-
right continuum. He concludes that candidates from left parties are more leftist than their 
electorate, while the candidates from right parties are more rightist than their electorate.  
Lachat (2008), in contrast, compares voters’ positions as measured by survey responses with 
party elites’ positions as measured by media content analysis, finding more dispersion on the 
mass level than on the elite level in the 1999 general Swiss elections: “The CVP and the SP 
are much closer to one another than are their voters. The same can be said of the liberal 
parties and the SVP” (Lachat 2008: 151). In light of the findings reported in the studies 
described above and those of Lutz (2008) that all analyze survey data for both groups, we 
expect to find a more polarized elite than general public – notwithstanding the contradicting 
results reported by Lachat (2008). 
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Intra-party Congruency 
The often-replicated finding that parties present policy positions which are more extreme than 
those of their supporters – i.e., that the political elite is more polarized than the general public 
– contradicts the implication of the basic proximity voting model (Iversen 1994; Adams and 
Merrill 1999, Adams et al. 2004). This traditional spatial theory predicts that, all else being 
equal, candidates and political parties gain electoral benefits when they moderate their policy 
positions, thereby approximating the median voter (Downs 1957, Enelow and Hinich 1984). 
Given the median voter theorem, why should radical or extreme parties compete in elections 
at all? Or, in other words, why should some parties represent their electorate more adequately 
than others, resulting in different levels of intra-party congruency? 
Recent studies suggest that the logic of spatial theory applies differently to different types of 
parties (Meguid 2005). Specifically, it is suggested that niche parties6 – namely parties of the 
extreme left (Communists), the extreme right (radical nationalist parties) or distinct non-
centrist parties (the Greens) – do not inevitably enhance their electoral support by presenting 
moderate programs. Ezrow (2008) argues that in multiparty systems, mainstream parties are 
generally rewarded for centrism, but that this does not hold for niche parties. On the contrary, 
as Ezrow demonstrates empirically, niche parties perform significantly better when 
representing rather radical value orientations.  
Similarly, and particularly interestingly for the Swiss case, is the work by Kedar (2005a, 
2005b) arguing that a consensual system benefits ideologically extreme parties. In a 
consensual system, a winning party faces, due to bargaining and compromise after the 
election, a “watering down” of their policy preferences. It follows then, that in a consensual 
setting – if voters are both concerned with policy outcomes and aware of these institutional 
mechanism – they are expected to vote for a party that holds similar but more extreme policy 
preferences. Kedar (2005b) finds empirical evidence that Swiss citizens do indeed apply such 
compensational voting strategies. 
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This line of reasoning is similar to the directional model of voting behavior proposed by 
Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989). The directional thesis states that voters support parties 
that take relatively extreme positions on their side of the issue. A less severe version of this 
thesis is the representational policy leadership model advanced by Iversen (1994). His 
“mixed” model includes both proximity and directional components. He demonstrates 
convincingly that voters tend to prefer politicians who offer clear and intense policy 
alternatives over politicians who simply “mirror their attitudes.” 
To summarize, both the strategic positioning of niche parties and voters’ intentions to support 
radical parties imply that ideologically extreme parties should have a lesser degree of intra-
party congruency than moderate parties. Studies that compare value orientations of the 
political elite and the general public using identical survey items for both groups tend to 
support this expectation. McAllister (1991) finds that the Australian Labour Party of the 
1980s and 1990s show a large ideological gap between its leaders and its supporters. Yet the 
Labour party was the most successful Australian party of the time, despite or – in line with the 
theoretical expectations outlined above – because of a low degree of intra-party congruency.  
For Switzerland, Lutz (2008) also reports differing levels of intra-party congruency. By 
comparing left-right self-placements of voters and candidates, he finds the largest ideological 
gap between politicians and supporters among the parties of the left (the Greens and Social 
Democrats). Specifically, the candidates of these parties are found to be much more leftist 
than their supporters. Lutz (2008) does observe the mirror image phenomenon on the right 
side of the ideological spectrum, but to a lesser degree. Candidates of the SVP and the FDP 
are more rightist than their electorate. Only the centrist party, the CVP, has been found to 
show a high level of intra-party congruency.  
These theories of niche party strategies (Ezrow 2008, Meguid 2005) and compensational 
voting (Kedar 2005) imply that we are likely to observe differing levels of party congruency 
in the Swiss multiparty system. Given the results reported by Lutz (2008), we expect to find 
the lowest degree of intra-party congruency among the Greens, as it is both ideologically 
more extreme and a niche party. The SVP and SP do not count as niche parties, but still may, 
due to compensational voting, have a significant degree of incongruence. Finally, the more 
centrist parties, the CVP and FDP, are expected to show more congruent value orientations. 
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The Remote But Successful Candidate 
The pattern frequently observed at the party level seems to hold at the individual level as well: 
Candidates with deviant policy preferences are more likely to get elected than candidates who 
reflect the political views of their electorate more accurately (Hetherington 2009). Again, how 
can we explain this rather counter-intuitive phenomenon?   
As Carey and Shugart (1995: 417) point out, seats not only have to be allocated to parties, but 
also to “specific candidates within parties.” Therefore, politicians running for office not only 
must defeat opponents from other parties but also those from their own party. This means that 
candidates must stand out during the electoral campaign and seek personal votes. The extent 
to which candidates have to develop personal reputations distinct from those of their party is 
considered to be shaped by electoral rules. For example, it is widely accepted that personal 
reputation is more valuable to legislative candidates in open list systems than in closed list 
systems (Carey and Shugart 1995). Open list systems, which allow personal votes, make 
parties less relevant and create incentives for individualism (Tavits 2009, Shugart et al. 2005). 
One strategy for creating personal reputation is to take positions that differ from that of the 
party (Carey and Shugart 1995: 418). Although it is plausible that candidates, particularly in 
open list systems such as the Swiss electoral system, have incentives to cultivate and proclaim 
independent policy preferences, the question remains in which direction they should deviate 
from their party and electorate. Proximity voting theory implies that successful candidates 
who are contesting elections will locate themselves near the center of the voter distribution. 
Yet empirical evidence contradicts the median voter theorem (Merrill and Grofman 1999). 
Adams et al. (2004: 351) find that candidates for the US Senate benefit when they are 
perceived as presenting distinctly non-centrist positions that reflected the policy direction of 
their electorates. This finding supports, again, the directional voting model, which accounts 
for the relative extremism of candidates’ positions in elections. 
Yet there may be an even more specific explanation for why successful candidates deviate 
more drastically from their electorate than unsuccessful candidates. According to Achen 
(1978), it is mainly incumbents that account for the observed effect. Incumbents are likely to 
be reelected but, at the same time, they differ more significantly from their supporters in their 
preferences than do first-time candidates. A study by Sullivan and Uslaner (1978), based on 
US data, supports Achen’s reasoning, as incumbents are found to have a greater probability of 
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winning reelection than their challengers even when the latter are closer to constituency 
opinion. 
McAllister (1991) also holds incumbents accountable for the observed phenomenon of remote 
but successful candidates. As incumbents often stand for safe seats, they need not rely heavily 
on their supporters and can better afford to deviate from their median preferences. But in 
contrast to Achen (1978), McAllister finds empirical support for Australian incumbents 
holding rather moderate views, i.e., they deviate from their party electorate and the non-
incumbent counterparts because they in fact hold rather centrist values. McAllister (1991) 
hypothesizes that incumbents undergo a socialization process in parliament in which their 
views generally get moderated. 
Results from Schwartz’ (2007) study, however, tend to support the directional voting model in 
general and the incumbency effect as described by Achen (1978) in particular. Schwartz 
(2007) finds that winning candidates of the last general Swiss elections have distinctively 
accentuated value preferences. Only SVP candidates’ electoral success is found to be 
independent from ideological positioning. Given the results reported by Schwarz (2007) and 
the theorized effects of Swiss electoral rules, namely the open list system, we expect to find 
significant differences between winning and losing candidates. More specifically, we expect 
to find winners to be distinctly more radical and remote from their party electorate. 
 
The Political Space: The Economic and the Cultural Dimension 
Traditionally, ideology has been conceptualized as a one-dimensional left-right continuum -- 
like the liberal-conservative continuum in the US -- (cf. Converse 1964, Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1989). This dimension, often also referred to as the socioeconomic dimension, 
reflects the economic conflicts within a modern democracy. Specific issues within this 
struggle are, among others, taxation, wealth redistribution, social security and free economic 
enterprise. More simply put, this is the conflict between socialist and capitalist ideology 
(Kitschelt 1994). Contestation on this dimension has predominated in most Western nations in 
the postwar period (Bartolini and Mair 1990). 
With the rise of new challenges to modern democracies, however, a new political dimension 
has emerged (Flanagan 1987). Kitschelt (1994) has laid out the theoretical foundation for this 
emerging conflict, terming this additional dimension ‘libertarian-authoritarian.’ This 
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dimension reflects issues such as minority rights, authority, law and order, civic protests and 
tradition. Other scholars (Marks et al. 2006) have dubbed this political conflict the GAL-TAN 
dimension: green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) versus traditionalism/authority/nationalism 
(TAN). Kriesi and Trechsel (2008), finally, describe the inherent conflict as cultural 
liberalism versus conservatism. 
For Western Europe it seems conventional to rely on such a two-dimensional space (see 
Kriesi et al. 2008), and it has been shown in several studies that the economic and the cultural 
dimensions accurately describe the political landscape of Switzerland. These broadly 
encompassing dimensions have been detected not only in analysis of party positioning in 
electoral campaigns (Lachat 2008), but also in analysis of the voting behavior of members of 
the Swiss parliament (Kriesi 2001, Leemann 2008) and in analysis of referendum votes 
(Hermann and Leuthold 2003).  
 
Data and Method 
Data 
The data we use in our analysis come from the SELECTS Voter Survey 2007 and the 
SELECTS Candidate Survey 2007. In these surveys, voters and candidates in the Swiss 
general elections of 2007 were asked about their political values. As the number of cases is 
limited at the constituency (cantonal) level, namely the number of elected candidates, we 
restrict the analysis to the national level.7 The sample used for estimation consists of 1,128 
unsophisticated, 1,144 sophisticated voters8 and 1,650 candidates, of which 125 were elected 
to office. Thirteen items, identical in each survey, are employed to measure the value 
orientations of voters and politicians (see Table A in the appendix for more details). We use 
these 13 items to create a two-dimensional political space with an economic and a cultural 
dimension and to locate voters and candidates within this political space. This procedure 
allows us to compare the political views of party elites and voters directly. 
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Method 
For the estimation of ideological positions we rely on Bayesian ordinal factor analysis. This is 
similar to polychoric factor analysis but instead of relying directly on the polychoric 
correlations, we first estimate the latent dimensions as in an ordered probit model, then 
connect the different items and finally create the two dimensions. Our measurement model 
has the usual IRT interpretation and therefore has the advantage of a direct connection to the 
spatial theory of political behavior (Clinton et al. 2004b).  In addition, ordinal IRT elegantly 
deals with non-binary and non-continuous response data. Instead of working with the 
observed ordinal measurements, we can estimate the latent and presumably continuous 
underlying variable and then extract the underlying dimensions based on these latent 
variables. This produces an estimation procedure that is both fully efficient and—given the 
assumptions of the model (see section “Estimation”)—unbiased. Because of its closer 
connection to theory and more general applicability, we rely on Bayesian ordered IRT – 
despite the fact that it is less well known than polychoric factor analysis. 
 
Identification 
Identification is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for estimation and therefore should 
be the first concern in every quantitative endeavor. This is especially true for ordinal factor 
analysis with an ordinal item response model since those models are not identifiable by the 
data alone – additional constraints are needed. Which and how many of these constraints are 
necessary is a function the dimensionality of the model. In one dimension, the task is 
relatively simple: one must pick an origin, a metric and a direction. The classical Kennedy-
Helms restriction achieves this by fixing the two U.S. legislators at -1 and +1, respectively, 
thereby choosing the origin (half way between Kennedy and Helms), a metric (the distance 
between Kennedy and Helms is two) and a direction (Helms is to the right of Kennedy), as in 
work by Rivers (2003:7).  
A popular alternative is to fix a distribution of ideal points, such as standard normal, which 
results in two independent restrictions: mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to 
one. One then must still choose which direction is to the right, but this is necessary only for 
global identification, not for local identification. However, with more than one dimension, the 
choice of constraints is more complicated. In a seminal paper, Rivers (2003) resolves this 
issue and proves both necessary and sufficient conditions for identification of spatial models 
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of arbitrary dimension. More concretely, he showed that in a d dimensional model, 
identification can be accomplished by either fixing d+1 points or vectors (i.e., legislators) or 
by imposing d (d+1) independent restrictions. In the following, for our d=2 dimensional 
model (economic left/right versus cultural left/right) for the elected members of the 
Nationalrat, we achieve local identification by applying the following 6 constraints:  
-  The average ideal points are assumed to be distributed standard normal in both dimensions, 
which results in 4 independent constraints.  
-  The item "Same sex marriages" is constrained to load only on the cultural dimension, which 
gives us one additional constraint.   
-  The item "Economic re‐distribution" is constrained to load only on the economic 
dimension, which gives us the last constraint needed for local identification.  
In addition, we make two additional assumptions to achieve not only local, but global 
identification: 
-  The item "Same sex marriages" is constrained to load positively on the social dimension, 
such that socially liberal legislators locate at the top of the ideological space.  
-  The item "Economic re‐distribution" is constrained to load negatively on the economic 
dimension, such that economically leftish legislators locate to the left of the ideological space.  
Again, these two additional assumptions have no effect on the absolute values of the factor 
loadings or ideal points; they simply specify which direction is to the left and to the bottom on 
the two dimensions. 
 
Estimation 
Having achieved global identification, we now turn to estimation. The ordinal measurement 
of our survey data makes it somewhat nonstandard both for item response theory models, 
which are usually based on binary indicators (yea or nay), and for normal theory factor 
analysis, which ordinarily uses continuous variables as input. An efficient but biased approach 
would be to treat the ordinal indicators as continuous, thereby assuming that the difference 
between ‘agree totally’ and ‘agree somewhat’ is the same as between ‘indifferent’ and 
‘disagree somewhat’. An unbiased but highly inefficient solution would be to dichotomize the 
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ordinal measurements and employ a binary item response model. We opt to use an ordered 
IRT model that also estimates latent dimensions and produces unbiased and efficient results. 
Furthermore, item response theory provides a statistical framework that can be shown to 
directly reflect the underlying spatial theory of politics.9 
 
Results 
In a first step, we consider the overall picture of the political orientations of Swiss voters and 
politicians. As can be seen in Figure 1, Swiss politicians are distributed in the political space 
as expected and as shown in previous scholarly work (Lachat 2008, Schwarz 2007, Kriesi et 
al. 2006). In the upper-left space we find the so-called left-libertarians, who are economically 
leftist and culturally liberal. These politicians consist mainly of Social Democrats (SPS) and 
the Greens (GPS). The center of the political sphere is occupied largely by representatives of 
the Christian Democrats (CVP), who are moderate on both dimensions. Candidates from the 
Liberal Party (FDP) are both economically and culturally liberal, whereas the representatives 
of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) are both economically and culturally rightist.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
In contrast to the pattern found among candidates, the spatial distribution of voters is rather 
ambiguous (see Figure 2). Although voters for the SPS and the Greens are found 
predominantly in the upper-left and voters for the SVP in the lower half, the observed pattern 
is not clear-cut. What can be said about the distribution of all voters, however, is that it 
concentrates heavily in the center of the political space.  
  (Figure 2 about here) 
One can conclude, therefore, that the political values of the elite tend to be more extreme than 
those of the general public. Furthermore, as the spaces in the lower-left and the upper-right 
are rather empty, the allocation of the elite’s values closely represents the conflict line 
suggested by Kitschelt (1994), namely the diagonal reaching from the left-libertarian extreme 
to the right-authoritarian. This finding is in line with results presented by Lachat (2008). He 
finds that the political space of Swiss party elites in the 1990s tends to converge to one 
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dimension, whereas the values of voters are adequately described only by two dimensions: an 
economic and a cultural dimension.  
Of more substantial interest here, however, is variation in the degree of political polarization 
between politicians and the general public. We measure polarization as the statistical variance 
of the estimated ideal points separately for each dimension. We find the elite to be more 
polarized than the electorate on both dimensions (see Table 1). Yet while the difference on the 
cultural dimension is rather minimal, it is substantial on the economic dimension. On the 
latter dimension, the variance of political values held by candidates is three times higher than 
that held by voters. As can been seen in Figure 3, this result is particularly due to the distinct 
socialist ideology of the representatives of the Social Democrats on the one extreme and the 
capitalist ideology of SVP politicians on the other. This finding is in line with McAllister 
(1991), who observes a larger dispersion on the left-right dimension than on authority issues 
among Australian politicians and citizens. 
 (Table 1 about here) 
However, as Hetherington (2009: 433) and others (cf. Zaller 1992, Converse 1964) note, we 
would expect that mass preferences will tend to bunch closer to the center than those of elites 
because of the substantial differences in ideological sophistication between the two groups. 
To test this expectation, we split up the voters into “sophisticated” and “unsophisticated” 
voters. As the estimates in Table 1 show, such a distinction does not make any significant 
difference. On the cultural dimension, the dispersion of sophisticated and unsophisticated 
voters is equal. On the economic dimension, politically sophisticated citizens are marginally 
more polarized, but their representatives remain much more dispersed.  
The empirical pattern of polarization presented here thus reflects Fiorina’s (2004) view of an 
increasingly polarized elite and a moderate general populace. It also confirms results from 
previous research that compared ideological polarization by employing survey data for both 
groups (McClosky et al. 1960, McAllister 1991, Lutz 2008). 
The second subject we highlight is whether intra-party congruency varies from party to party. 
We expect to find the lowest degree of intra-party congruency within the Greens, as it is both 
an ideologically extreme and a niche party. The SVP and SPS are not niche parties, but still 
may, due to their distinct policy preferences, show a significant degree of incongruency. 
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Indeed, we do find such varying intra-party congruency levels. As can be seen in Figure 3 
(see also Table 2), all parties but the CVP show substantial divergence in ideological 
dispersion between their leaders and their supporters. The largest gaps are found within the 
SPS (.71) and the SVP (.61). Their discrepancies are even higher than that of the Greens (.43), 
which can be regarded as a niche party. In particular, ideological differences between the 
electorate and their party leaders are mainly attributable to diverging values on the economic 
dimension. Representatives of both the left and the right are much more extreme in their 
socioeconomic views than is their electorate (see Figure 3). These results confirm Lutz’s 
(2008) finding that representatives of both the Swiss left and right are far more radical than 
their supporters and are thereby misrepresenting the latter.  
It must be noted, however, that the relatively high degree of ideological congruency within 
the CVP may simply be a result of its location in the center. Since not only CVP voters, but 
all voters generally tend to be located around the center, the CVP elite is much more likely to 
represent their voters adequately. Party elites from both the left and the right, on the other 
hand, are more extreme and thereby run risk of deviating from their moderate party 
electorates. Remarkably, this pattern also holds when only sophisticated voters are 
considered. Although sophisticated voters are consistently closer to their candidates than 
unsophisticated across all five major parties (see Table 2), the gap between elites and the 
general populace remains smaller among the parties of the center, notably smallest within the 
CVP. 
 (Figure 3 about here) 
The results concerning intra-party congruency are interesting insofar as they both confirm and 
contradict previous findings from Australia derived by similar data. In contrast to McAllister 
(1991), we find no evidence that misrepresentation is characteristic of the left in particular. 
Rather, all parties with distinct value orientations are prone to ideological incongruency. In 
line with McAllister (1991), however, we ascertain that the degree of congruency does not 
correlate with electoral success. On the one hand, the ideological distance between voters for 
and candidates from the SVP and the Greens are substantial, but these two parties performed 
well in elections. On the other hand, the SPS underperformed in elections but show a similar 
voter-candidate gap.  
These results challenge traditional spatial voting theory, as parties relatively distant from the 
preferred position of the electorate are not penalized. On the contrary, and in line with Ezrow 
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(2008), the Greens, as a niche party, are doing well by presenting non-centrist policy 
preferences. Similarly, the electoral success of the SVP might be explained by their 
distinct rightist value orientation. Swiss voters may actually vote for an extreme party on their 
side of the ideological continuum, as they may fear their preferences will be watered down in 
the Swiss consensual system (Kedar 2005b). We can conclude that the pattern of intraparty 
congruency found contests the median voter theorem but accords nicely with “mixed” models 
that include both proximity and directional components (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989, 
Iversen 1994). 
 (Table 2 about here) 
Finally, we analyze whether successful candidates’ positions differ systematically from the 
positions held by unsuccessful candidates. More precisely, we examine whether winners are 
more distant from their electorate than losers, as has been found previously (Achen 1978). It 
is widely accepted that in open list systems such as the Swiss electoral system, politicians are 
urged to seek the personal vote (see Carey and Shugart 1995) and benefit from presenting 
non-centrist policy preferences (Adams et al. 2004). For the Swiss general elections in 2007, 
Schwarz (2007) finds that, save the SVP, candidates who won their election hold more 
accentuated value orientations than candidates who did not. 
Our analysis replicates Schwarz’ (2007) results (see Figure 4). Across all major parties, 
winning candidates are found to be more distant from their party electorate than losing 
candidates. Only within the SVP does electoral success seem to be largely independent of 
politicians’ ideological positioning. In regard to the SPS, FDP and the Greens, the parties with 
the largest gaps, we note that most of the difference can be attributed to the cultural 
dimension. Successful candidates from these parties are distinctively culturally liberal. Taking 
the sophistication level of voters into account does not change the overall pattern (see Table 
2). However, we consistently find the closest relationship between sophisticated voters and 
unsuccessful candidates. This may be explained by the fact that many candidates do not run 
for elections with serious expectations and often do not even campaign. Rather, they are asked 
by party officials to place themselves at the disposal of the party in order to complete the 
party list. Such candidates may not differentiate themselves significantly from politically 
sophisticated citizens. 
 (Figure 4 about here) 
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Our data also confirm the expectation that successful candidates are more remote from their 
electorate because they hold distinct non-centrist values. This may be due to incumbent 
effects (Achen 1978, Sullivan and Uslaner 1978), but our results specifically contest 
McAllister’s (1991) socialization hypothesis. McAllister assumes that incumbents’ 
preferences are moderated in a parliamentary setting, but that they will not be penalized for 
such a deviation by their electorate. Although we do not test specifically for incumbent 
effects, our data suggest that successful candidates, and hence very likely incumbents, gain 
votes by presenting non-centrist preferences (see Adams et al. 2004).  
Our findings on the candidate level are similar to those on the party level: radical politicians 
are more likely to get elected than moderate candidates. This again challenges the median 
voter theorem (Merrill and Grofman 1999). It appears that in Switzerland, arguably because 
of its open list system, candidates gain personal votes when presenting distinct positions. 
Again, in line with the directional voting model, the electorate favors more extreme 
politicians of their ideological family. 
 
Conclusion 
In this descriptive study we analyze whether (1) the Swiss elite or the general public is more 
ideologically polarized, (2) whether there are varying levels of intra-party congruency, and (3) 
whether successful candidates are more ideologically remote from their party supporters than 
unsuccessful candidates. We find that the two-dimensional space (represented by an economic 
and a cultural dimension) applied in our study closely represents the value orientations of the 
Swiss electorate and its representatives.  
While the Swiss elite shows a clear distributional pattern reaching from the left-libertarian 
pole to the right-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994), the picture of the electorate is rather 
ambiguous. Swiss voters are generally clustered around the center, resulting in much less 
polarization than among candidates. It has been observed for the United States that this 
ideological disconnect is largely driven by the growing polarization of representatives. 
Lacking time series data, we can only speculate on whether this holds true for the Swiss case. 
However, given the decline of the two centrist parties, the CVP and FDP, in the most recent 
elections, the divergence in ideological dispersion may well be explained by growing 
polarization on the elite level rather than by concentration on the voter level.  
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These diverging levels of polarization are found even when voters’ levels of sophistication are 
taken into account – contrary to our expectations. This undermines the hypothesis that lesser 
polarization within the electorate can be attributed to ideological inconsistency or indifference 
(Zaller 1992, Convese 1964). Rather, our data suggest that candidates are more diverse due to 
the self-selection process of politically radical citizens becoming politicians (Rokeach 1973) 
or to intra-party socialization and nomination processes (May 1973).  
The finding of a moderate general public but polarized elite has direct consequences for intra-
party congruence. It follows logically that parties from the left and right, each presenting 
policy programs of the ideological poles, are likely to represent their electorates relatively 
poorly. Representatives of the centrist party, the CVP, in contrast, are close to their 
supporters, mainly because they themselves are located near the center, with the majority of 
voters. That non-centrist parties are not penalized for such deviances from their electorate can 
be explained by voting models that include both proximity and directional components 
(Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989, Iversen 1994). 
The directional model also helps us explain the rather counter-intuitive phenomenon of 
remote but successful candidates. Apparently, Swiss voters favor candidates who are on the 
same side of the ideological spectrum but who are also more extreme. The pattern found at 
both the candidate and party levels contradicts the implication of the basic proximity voting 
model (see also Iversen 1994, Adams and Merrill 1999, Merrill and Grofman 1999). This 
traditional spatial theory predicts that, all else being equal, candidates and political parties 
receive electoral benefits when they moderate their policy positions and thereby approximate 
the median voter (Downs 1957, Enelow and Hinich 1984). This is clearly not the case in our 
analysis. 
Although the patterns observed accord nicely with the directional model, it must be noted that 
our study is not a proper test of this model. Nevertheless, we believe that in this case the 
theory of directional voting behavior is more compelling than theories of strategic behavior, 
as the former focuses on voters while the latter focus on the strategies of parties and 
candidates. As we employ anonymous survey data for both the general public and the elite, 
we doubt the existence of any party or personal strategy behind candidates’ responses in the 
survey. Hence, our results are better explained by directional voting than by strategic 
positioning of niche parties (Ezrow 2008) or personal vote seeking (Carey and Shugart 1995).  
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Furthermore, our results on all three aspects generally confirm previous findings from 
international and Swiss studies alike. But we observe, in contrast to Lachat (2008), that the 
Swiss elite is more polarized than the electorate. To be fair, Lachat (2008) finds this pattern 
only for the 1995 elections and not for the 1999 elections, so the difference may merely 
constitute a period effect. However, there may be also methodological reasons for the 
contradictory results, as Lachat derived party elite preferences from media content analysis. 
As our data are derived from surveys for both groups, we can notably preclude biases from 
party pressure or strategic voting behavior – biases that are known to be found in other 
sources, specifically in roll call data (Clinton et al. 2004b, Cox and McCubbins 2005). 
In order to derive theory-based expectations for the empirical part of our study, we also 
discuss some institutional factors peculiar to the Swiss electoral system. For instance, we 
argue that the multi-party and consensual system (Ezrow 2008, Kedar 2005b) in Switzerland 
may benefit parties at the ideological poles, resulting in a lower level of congruency within 
the parties on the left and the right. Likewise, we hypothesize that in the Swiss open-list 
system, candidates are expected to represent positions that are independent of the party 
position in order to seek personal votes (Carey and Shugart 1995, Tavits 2009). Indeed, we 
find empirical evidence for these lines of reasoning. However, the same results have been 
found in other countries with different institutional settings (Achen 1978, McAllister 1991). 
Although these studies are not directly comparable with our analysis, we find no evidence that 
the mass-elite relationship is shaped by country-specific institutional factors. For instance, 
ideologically deviant candidates in the Swiss proportional voting system are also more likely 
to get elected as deviant candidates running for US Congress in that first-past-the-post system. 
And in regard to ideological polarization, we find a considerable elite-mass gap as observed in 
other countries, despite the presence of considered egalitarian institutions such as the “semi-
professional” parliament (Milizsystem) and direct-democratic instruments. 
Finally, we point out a limitation of our study. Due to the small number of cases at the 
constituency (cantonal) level, namely that of the elected candidates, we have restricted our 
analysis to the national level. However, as many scholars have noted (cf. Miller and Stokes 
1963, Herrera et al. 1992), it may be crucial to analyze voters’ and politicians’ preferences on 
the constituency level. First, it may be particularly be true for the Swiss federal system that 
national parties vary substantially from constituency to constituency. Second, candidates seek 
not only to gain votes from their party supporters, but from all voters in their constituency. As 
we cannot control for such constituency effects, we cannot preclude bias concerning our 
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findings. For example, it may be possible that the differing levels of ideological polarization 
between the elite and the general public may be smaller on the cantonal level than on the 
national level. Similarly, a successful candidate may significantly deviate from the voter mean 
of the national sample but only marginally from the voter mean of her or his constituency. 
Taking constituency effects into account when comparing value orientations of the elites and 
the general public is an important challenge left for future research. 
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Table 1. Polarization among Swiss Voters and Candidates Measured by their Variance 
Variance All voters Sophisticated 
Voters 
Unsophisticated 
Voters 
All candidates 
Economic  Dimension 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.58 
Cultural Dimension 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.52 
Number of observations 2,272 1,144 1,128 1,650 
Note: 125 of the 1,650 candidates won the election. 
 
Table 2. The Euclidean Distances between Voters and Candidates by Party 
Euclidean distance FDP CVP SP SVP Greens 
Voters – candidates 0.35 0.05 0.71 0.61 0.43 
Sophistic. v. - candidates 0.29 0.04 0.66 0.57 0.39 
Unsophistic. v. – candidates 0.45 0.09 0.77 0.64 0.48 
Voters - elected candidates 0.48 0.16 0.93 0.67 0.70 
Sophistic. v. - elected cand. 0.44 0.15 0.88 0.63 0.69 
Unsophistic. v. - elected cand. 0.57 0.19 0.98 0.70 0.72 
Voters - not elected cand. 0.34 0.05 0.69 0.60 0.42 
Sophistic. v. - not elected cand. 0.28 0.04 0.64 0.56 0.38 
Unsophistic. v. - not elected c. 0.44 0.09 0.75 0.63 0.47 
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Figure 1. The Political Value Orientations of Candidates by Party 
 
Note: For visual clarity, only 300 candidates (drawn by chance) are displayed. 
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Figure 2. The Political Value Orientations of Voters by Party 
 
Note: For visual clarity, only 300 voters (drawn by chance) are displayed. 
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Figure 3. The Median Voter and the Median Candidate by Party 
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Figure 4. The Median Voter, the Median Elected, and the Median Not-Elected Candidate by 
Party 
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Technical Appendix 
This appendix specifies the exact statistical model used in this paper. Readers familiar with 
the two-parameter item response model will find many similarities between that model and 
the model we employ. To fix ideas, we must introduce some notation (partly following Quinn 
2004). Let j=1, … , J index response variables and i=1, … , N index observations. Let X 
denote the N × J matrix of observed responses. The observed variable xij is ordinal with c = 1, 
… , 5 categories for all variables in X.  The values of the elements of X are assumed to be 
determined by a N × J  matrix X* of latent variables and a series of cutpoints γcj, where the 
first element γ1j is normalized to zero for all j. The latent variables X* are assumed to be 
generated by the following normal-linear model:  
xi
*
 = Λ ϕi + α + εi  where  εi  ~ N(0,1)  
where xi* is the J-vector of latent variables specific to observation i, Λ is the J × d  matrix of 
factor loadings, and ϕi  is the d-vector of latent ideal points, and α  is the J -vector of item 
difficulty parameters. The probability that the j th variable in observation i takes the value c is 
therefore the difference:  
Φ(γic – Λj' ϕi - αj) – Φ(γi(c-1) – Λj' ϕi - αj) 
where Φ(•) is the standard normal CDF. Hence, this model is similar to the standard ordinal 
probit model in the same way that the two-parameter IRT model can be thought of as a special 
case of the binary logit model.  
Our mode of inference is Bayesian. To complete our model specification, we must choose 
priors for all the unknown parameters. Following Martin and Quinn (2005), we assume 
independent and conjugate priors for each element of Λ and each ϕi. More specifically, we 
use the following fairly non-informative priors:  
Λjd  ~ N(0,2)   j=1, … , J,  d=1,2  
ϕid  ~ N(0,1)   i=1, … , N, d=1,2  
αj  ~ N(0,2)   j=1, … , J 
where N(•,2) indicates a variance of 2, not precision, as more commonly used in Bayesian 
notation. The program we use for estimation is part of the freely available R package 
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MCMCpack (Martin and Quinn 2005) that implements the Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs 
algorithm by Cowles (1996). The Cowles algorithm is well suited for ordinal probit models 
because the Metropolis-Hastings step protects the variance of the γs to shrink towards zero, 
thereby leading to slow mixing of the chain (see e.g. Lynch 2007 for a gentle introduction). 
We run a single chain for 100'000 iterations, discarding the first 50'000 as burn-in. Thinning 
by a factor of 100 to save memory space, we end up with 500 posterior draws for each 
parameter. None of the usual tests - Geweke, Raftery and Lewis, Heidelberger and Welch, 
and graphical diagnostics - showed any signs of non-convergence 
The interest of this paper lies in the ideal point of political candidates and their constituency. 
However, we do omit the discussion of the estimates for the item difficulty parameter, item 
discrimination parameters and factor loadings for the economic and cultural dimension, which 
are not of primary relevance here, but simply refer the interested reader to Table B in the 
appendix. 
Although the assumption that the ideological space for both voters and candidates is two-
dimensional is primarily theoretically motivated, we check its empirical appropriateness 
extensively. We use maximum-likelihood based factor analysis for continuous variables as a 
quick approximation and obtain the following (rotated) eigenvalues for the first six 
dimensions. Elected candidates: 2.6, 2.2, 1.2, 0.9, .2, .1.; unsuccessful candidates: 1.9, 1.4, 
1.3, .9, .03, .03; voters: 1.3, 1.2, .8, .6, .08. This generally indicates an elbow-shaped drop 
after the second eigenvalue, thereby confirming the theoretical assumption of a two-
dimensional space for both voters and candidates. 
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Appendix 
Table A. Question Wording of the Items 
Item Wording 
Immigrant customs Immigrants should be required to adjust to the customs of 
Switzerland              
Free economy Politics should abstain from intervening in the 
economy                            
Environment protection Stronger measures should be taken to protect the 
environment                      
Same sex marriages Same sex marriages should be approved by 
law                                     
Stiff sentences People who break the law should be given stiffer 
sentences                      
Social security Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime 
goal of govern   
Economic re-distribution Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary 
people                  
Democracy reform Our democracy needs serious reform                                                 
Immigrants for economy Immigrants are good for the Swiss 
economy                                         
Abortion Women should be free to decide on matters of 
abortion                            
War on terror Switzerland should provide military assistance to the "war" on 
terror            
Torturing prisoners Torturing a prisoner is never justified even if it might prevent a 
terrorist attack    
Open economy The ongoing opening of the economies is for the good of all  
 
Table B. Results of the Factor Analysis / Item Response Model 
Item 
Negative item 
difficulty 
Factor loading 
economic dimension 
Factor loading 
cultural dimension 
Immigrant customs 2.63 0.75 -1.12 
Free economy 0.77 1.15 0.14 
Environment protection 3.85 -1.96 0.95 
Same sex marriages 0.86 0.00 0.99 
Stiff sentences 2.81 0.83 -1.46 
Social security 2.15 -1.20 -0.29 
Economic re-distribution 1.44 -2.13 0.00 
Democracy reform 1.03 -0.20 0.56 
Immigrants for economy 2.84 -0.64 0.78 
Abortion 1.30 -0.74 0.45 
War on terror 1.09 0.29 -0.07 
Torturing prisoners 2.11 -0.06 1.04 
Open economy 1.56 0.60 0.62 
The first row of parameters can be interpreted as (negative) item difficulty similar to standard IRT models. The 
second row shows the factor loadings / item discrimination parameters on the economic dimension, the third row 
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the factor loadings / item discrimination parametres on the cultural dimension. The fourth coefficient of the 
second row and the seventh row of the third coefficient are set to zero by assumption. 
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Abstract German 
Wenig ist bekannt über die ideologische Beziehung zwischen Schweizer Politikern und 
Wählern. Mit Daten aus den SELECTS 2007 Kandidaten- und Wählerbefragungen werden 
anhand einer ordinalen Faktoranalyse die Wertorientierungen der beiden Gruppen verglichen. 
Erstens wird untersucht, ob die politische Elite oder die Bürger ideologisch polarisierter sind. 
Zweitens wird ermittelt, ob die ideologische Kongruenz zwischen Politikern und deren 
Wählerschaft von Partei zu Partei verschieden ist. Drittens wird analysiert, ob gewählte 
Kandidaten ideologisch distanzierter von ihrem Elektorat sind als nicht gewählte Kandidaten. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Elite polarisierter ist als das Elektorat. Konsequenterweise 
repräsentieren die Politiker der ideologisch prononcierten Parteien ihre Wähler 
vergleichsweise schlecht. Schliesslich zeigt sich auch, dass erfolgreiche Kandidaten 
ideologisch weiter entfernt sind von ihrer Parteiwählerschaft als nicht erfolgreiche 
Kandidaten. Während diese Resultate das klassische räumliche Wahltheorem (proximity 
voting) in Frage stellen, stützen sie die Theorie des directional voting. 
 
Abstract French 
La relation idéologique existant entre l’élite politique suisse et le grand public demeure 
méconnue. Sur la base de l’étude SELECTS 2007, portant sur les électeurs comme sur les 
candidats, nous procédons à une comparaison des deux groupes du point de vue de leur 
orientation en terme de valeur en pratiquant une ordinal factor analysis. Dans un premier 
temps, nous investiguons et comparons le degré de polarisation idéologique de chacun des 
deux groupes. Dans un deuxième temps, nous analysons dans quelle mesure la variation de la 
congruence idéologique entre les élus et les votants diffère de parti en parti. Troisièmement, 
nous nous demandons si les candidats élus, en contraste avec les candidats non élus, sont 
tendanciellement plus éloignés idéologiquement des électeurs de leur parti. Nous concluons 
que la polarisation idéologique de l’élite politique est plus forte que celle du public. En 
conséquence, l’électorat, relativement modéré dans ses orientations, se voit représenté par des 
élus ayant une orientation plus extreme du point des vues des valeurs défendues. De façon 
similaire, les candidats élus se trouvent être plus distants de leur électorat que les candidats 
non élus. Ces conclusions remettent en question les présupposés classiques de la théorie 
spatiale du vote (proximity voting) en allant dans le sens du modèle d’explication 
directionnelle des comportements électoraux (directional voting). 
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